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ABSTRACT 
The crucial role that mathematical notation systems have played in the success of the 
hard or mathematical sciences is well known and richly documented: the origin of the 
history of these sophisticated notation systems more or less coincides with the birth of 
modern science. The role of our linguistic notation systems (as applied to, or used in, 
the scientific study of nature), by contrast, is hardly documented at all, at least not in a 
systematic way. We distinguish between (metaphorical and non-metaphorical) meta-
scientific terms and scientific terms and, as far as the latter is concerned, between me-
thodology and content terms. It is the latter sort of terms that interest us here. Five 
different dysfunctions in the relationship between scientific linguistic tokens and their 
referents will be presented and illustrated: scientific terms or phrases can not only be 
imprecise, they can also be meaningless, indiscriminate, inapt and ambiguous. By cor-
recting or alleviating such dysfunctions, our linguistic notation systems have, in the 
course of the past four centuries, become more refined and functional scientific tools. 
This simple, illustrated taxonomy is not only historically relevant, it may also help con-
temporaneous scientists to identify and avoid possible pitfalls, associated with the use of 
language in science. 
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problems 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In his recent, ‘new’ and language-centric history of the sequence of events that we, sin-
ce the early to mid-twentieth century, call the Scientific Revolution, David Wootton [1] 
rightly points out that the modern history of science, for all its talk of languages and dis-
courses, “has not been nearly attentive enough to the emergence in the seventeenth cen-
tury of a new language for doing natural science” (p. 48) and that “the basic history of 
some key words/concepts which make the scientific enterprise possible remains to be 
written” (ibid.). “This language reflected the revolution that science was undergoing, 
but it also made that revolution possible” (p. 249). He does not make the distinction 
himself, but the phrase ‘Scientific Revolution’ is, confusingly, used for both the remar-
kable revolution that, somewhere between the 15
th
 and the 18
th
 centuries, took place in 
the methodology we used for acquiring knowledge about the world (the methodological 
revolution), and for a number of actual ‘revolutions’ in our ‘scientific’ knowledge that 
occurred in the course of that same time frame (content revolutions). When discussing 
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linguistic reference in science, we can and should make a corresponding distinction be-
tween science-methodology and science-content terms. It is only one of a number of ter-
minological distinctions that we will introduce in section one, where the topic of the 
present paper will be situated in the larger body of extant scholarship on (the history of) 
notation systems, as applied to, or used in, science (‘scientific notation systems’). That 
topic itself, a systematic survey of dysfunctions and (qualitative) progress in non-meta-
phorical science-content terminology, is elaborated in section 2.   
 
1. The extant scholarship on scientific notation systems: a survey. 
  
The most basic distinction that can be made, within the extant scholarship on scientific 
notation systems, is that between mathematical (including logic) notation systems and 
linguistic notation systems. The central role that mathematical notation systems played 
and play in the success of the hard or mathematical sciences is well illustrated by the 
historical fact that the origin of the history of these notation systems more or less coin-
cides with the birth of modern science. Mathematics was originally, apart from number 
systems and a few other, isolated exceptions, indeed mostly written verbally or rhetori-
cally, often even in metered poetry.
1
 Euclid’s Elements, for example, hardly contained 
any mathematical symbols. Even Galileo still formulated his laws of uniformly acce-
lerated motion verbally. In the course of the past four centuries, mathematicians not on-
ly invented new notation systems (for new or for existing branches of mathematics), the 
best systems also seem to have invariably won out (an example of ‘epistemological se-
lection’). Mazur [2] gives the example of negative numbers (real numbers that are less 
than zero). As soon as they were accepted as numbers, there was great debate about how 
to write them. As late as the 19th century, some mathematicians asserted that negative 
numbers should be written as positive numbers flipped horizontally, in spite of the evi-
dent confusion this would engender for numbers containing a ‘0’ or an ‘8’, or for letters 
like ‘b’ and ‘d’.2  
   As to linguistic notation systems, the main though somewhat fluid distinction is that 
between metaphorical and non-metaphorical (literal) terms. There exists a rich and inte-
resting literature on the widespread but double edged and, hence, ambivalently valued 
use of metaphors in science and in particular in the non-mathematical sciences (see, e.g., 
[3]). A related topic is the so-called rhetoric of science: the use, by scientists, of rhetorical tech-
niques to persuade their peers. As to literal terms and phrases: a first distinction that we can 
make is that between meta-scientific terms and scientific terms sensu stricto. The former are 
terms and phrases like ‘the Scientific Revolution’, ‘revolution’, ‘science’, ‘scientist’ [4], ‘biolo-
gy’ or ‘physicist’, that we use to talk and think about the scientific enterprise and its many bran-
ches. It is interesting to note, as an aside, that whereas the phrase ‘the Scientific Revolution’ 
seems to have been first coined by the American philosopher John Dewey in 1915, contem-
poraries of this historic upheaval, like Robert Hooke, spoke of a Reformation in (natural) 
Philosophy (cf. [1], p. 34), which may be a more accurate phrase (it is, as a matter of fact, only 
in the 19
th
 century that the term ‘science’ began to be commonly used for what, until then, had 
been generally known as ‘natural philosophy’). 
                                                          
1
 Examples of early, isolated and ‘infertile’ mathematical notation systems are Diophantus’ third century 
BC algebraic notation and Oresme’s 14th century notation for powers with rational exponents.  
2
 Some mathematicians even denoted negative numbers with a waxing moon symbol, and positive num-
bers with a waning moon symbol. 
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   It are the terms that were central to that (methodological) ‘Reformation’ in or of natural 
philosophy that Wootton refers to when he speaks about “a new language for doing natural 
science.” It is indeed remarkable that this new language has, as yet, not received more 
attention. The main reason undoubtedly is that these science-methodology terms have 
become so ingrained in our culture and society that we cannot imagine a world in which 
they do not exist (in their modern meaning). Take ‘discovery’, for instance. It is only in 
the mid-16
th
 century that this word was introduced in English to denote ‘the fact of 
obtaining knowledge of something which was not known’, thanks to the discovery of, 
until then, unknown parts of our globe. “Before discovery history was assumed to repeat 
itself and tradition to provide a reliable guide to the future; and the greatest achievements of 
civilization were believed to lie not in the present or the future but in the past, in ancient Greece 
and classical Rome” ([1], p. 61). Even facts did not exist (in the modern meaning of ‘things that 
have, through experience, been proven to be true’) before the Scientific Revolution. 
Philosophers were rather preoccupied with ‘phenomena’, everything which was generally 
accepted to be the case, and with ‘saving’ or ‘salving’ those phenomena. 
   In the subcategory of science-content terms, we can in the first place make the classic dis-
tinction between theoretical terms (i.e., terms whose semantics depends upon a scientific theory) 
and observational terms (i.e., terms that refer to entities that are, supposedly, directly observable 
in the sense of unaided perception). More interesting for our purposes is the less classic distinc-
tion between quantitative and qualitative progress in science-content terminology. The former 
kind of progress concerns the steady increment of scientific terms and phrases, coined to 
denominate new discoveries and insights, either by appropriating vernacular words for a 
new, scientific use (e.g., ‘gravity’, a synonym of ‘seriousness’ for ‘downward accelera-
tion of objects’) or by inventing new (metaphorical) terms (e.g., ‘gravitation’, from the 
Latin verb ‘gravitare’ for the attracting force behind gravity). This kind of progress or 
change has not yet been systematically documented, although we do of course have 
science dictionaries and semantic case studies of crucial scientific terms like ‘evolution’ 
[5]. The second, qualitative kind of progress mainly concerns improvements in the cor-
respondence between scientific linguistic tokens and their referent(s). This kind of pro-
gress is much more tentative and ambivalent than the quantitative sort but nevertheless 
real, as we will explain and illustrate in the next section.
3
  
 
2. Linguistic tokens and their referent(s): a systematic survey.  
 
Wittgenstein [6] claimed that it was the task of science to investigate matters of fact, 
whereas philosophy merely had to clarify the meaning of terms, i.e., spot, diagnose and 
‘cure’ ‘sick’ scientific terms. Some of his enthusiastic followers took this advice too 
much to heart or too literally though (as followers are wont to do). Their critics mocked 
that they rather resembled neurotic carpenters than the linguistic doctors Wittgenstein 
had in mind as they devoted all of their time to burnishing and sharpening their tools 
(language) instead of using them to cut and shape wood (develop insights and theories 
about philosophical questions). One of these critics was Karl Popper [7]. He argued that 
the view that the precision of science and of scientific language depends upon the pre-
cision of its terms was certainly very plausible, but none the less a mere prejudice. Phi-
losophy, he observed, “which for twenty centuries has worried about the meaning of its 
terms” (p. 17) was appallingly vague and ambiguous, while a science like physics, 
                                                          
3
 These two kinds of change or progress can of course not be seen, independently from each other, in that 
the qualitative kind often involves, or is accompanied by, the introduction of new terms. 
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which worries hardly at all about terms and their meaning, but about facts instead, has 
achieved great precision. Scientists, Popper – a physicist by training - wrote, do not 
overburden their terms. “We try to attach to them as little weight as possible. We do not 
take their ‘meaning’ too seriously” (p. 18).  
   Popper in the first place makes a classic logical mistake by assuming that there ne-
cessarily exists some kind of causal or explanatory relationship between two correlated 
features of modern philosophy: on the one hand its (alleged) vagueness and ambiguity 
and on the other hand its preoccupation with terms and their meaning. It is furthermore 
of course correct that the “great precision” of the (mathematical) sciences does not (pri-
marily) depend upon the precision of the linguistic notation system that scientists use. It 
is rather a result of the rigid precision of their mathematical notation systems. However, 
this does, like the (alleged) indifference of physicists to the exact meaning of terms, not 
necessarily say much about the (lack of) importance of linguistic notation systems to 
science in general and to what might be called the ‘terminological’ (as opposed to ma-
thematical) sciences in particular.
4
 We will briefly present a survey of various possible 
dysfunctions in the relationship between terms and their referent(s) and also give ex-
amples of concrete (historical) dysfunctions that have been, or could be, (further) resol-
ved or at least alleviated. Scientific terms can, as we shall see, not only be imprecise, 
they can also be meaningless, indiscriminate, inapt and ambiguous. Resolving or allevi-
ating these dysfunctions ipso facto improves the communication and collaboration be-
tween scientists, and thus allows science to proceed. 
 
2.1. Meaningless terms. 
 
Many terms do not have a concrete referent in the real world, nor are they inspired by 
concrete phenomena in that world or do they qualify a referent or referents. They are, in 
this empirical sense, completely ‘empty’. However, that does not necessarily mean that 
they are meaningless, since most ‘empty’ terms do have a ‘mental’ referent, i.e., they re-
fer to an idea or concept.
5
 This is the case with fictional figures and beings like James 
Bond, mermaids, unicorns, and (for atheists) God; with fictional places like heaven or 
hell and with terms like nobody and zero. These words may not designate anything in 
the material world (i.e., they do not have a real-world content), even though people who 
use them may think so, but they do designate something in the mental world of these 
persons (i.e., they have a mental-world content) and can, in this sense, even have a huge 
impact on their thinking and behavior (i.e., be very meaningful, not only because of 
their epistemic denotation but also because of attached emotional connotations). This 
                                                          
4
 Concepts are as important in the mathematical sciences as they are in the non-mathematical sciences. 
That is the reason why we speak of ‘terminological sciences’, not of ‘conceptual sciences’. 
5
 In some exceptional cases, terms have a referent in the real world (i.e., they are not empty) that differs 
from the mental referent. The classic example, here, is the planet that we call Venus. The ancient Greeks 
saw this wandering star or planet rise two times a day, in the evening and in the morning, and conse-
quently assumed that there were two planets: Hesperus (the evening planet), initially considered to be the 
son of Eos (the Dawn) and the Titan Astraeus (but later said to be the son or brother of Atlas) and his 
half-brother Phosphorus (the morning planet). Both terms had one and the same real-world referent (Ve-
nus) but a differing mental-world referent (Hesperus and Phosphorus). In standard philosophy of langua-
ge, this classic semantic puzzle (also called Frege’s puzzle) is of course explained in a somewhat diffe-
rent way: Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same referent (i.e., they refer to the same object in the real 
world), but they differ in ‘sense’ or mode of presentation because they present Venus in different ways 
(i.e., Venus as seen in the evening and Venus as seen in the morning). 
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impact can be benign (i.e., a child that is comforted by the ‘presence’ of its fictional 
friend) or malignant (i.e., a man who kills his son to soothe a vindictive God).  
   Likewise, scientific terms can be empirically empty but at the same time refer to im-
portant ideas or concepts and, in this mental sense, be extremely meaningful and im-
portant. The term ‘zero’, on which, paradoxically, much of the modern world is based, 
is a good example [8]. Meaningless scientific terms, by contrast, are empty terms whose 
scientific relevance or meaning was solely derived from their alleged empirical content. 
Once this empirical content was falsified, these terms became, scientifically, meaning-
less. Examples are the supposedly space-filling substance ‘ether’; ‘phlogiston’, the non-
existent chemical or element that, until the 18
th
 century, was thought to be released du-
ring combustion or oxidation and Johann F. Blumenbach’s ‘Bildungstrieb’ or ‘nisus for-
mativus’: a vital energy (as opposed to mechanical force) that allegedly was central to 
the phenomena of generation, growth, nutrition and reproduction. Such terms (i.e., their 
mental referent) sometimes inspired important scientific research (e.g., the Michel-son-
Morley experiment that falsified the existence of luminiferous ether and that was, in the 
standard account, one of the sources of inspiration of Einstein’s theory of special re-
lativity) but in the first place fostered the illusion of knowledge, one of the major ob-
stacles to scientific discovery.
6
 The ‘unmasking’ of such terms as ‘empty’ can, in this 
sense, be considered an important exponent of qualitative progress in our linguistic no-
tation systems (as used in, or applied to, science). 
 
2.2. Imprecise terms. 
 
Many terms are not empirically void but, nevertheless, very vague and difficult to defi-
ne. Put differently: it is difficult to describe their real-world referent or the real-world 
phenomena by which they are inspired. John Herschel [9] spoke in this respect of “in-
definite” terms, “as hard or soft, light or heavy (terms which were at one time the 
sources of innumerable mistakes and controversies)” (pp. 20-21) and of “excessively 
complex” terms, “as man, life, instinct” (p. 21). Other examples are ‘time’ (physics) and 
‘play’ (biology and psychology). In some cases, this vagueness is so pronounced that 
the scientific meaning of the terms in question can be doubted. The term ‘conscious-
ness’, for example, is so hopelessly vague that Mayr [10] deemed it unfit for “detailed 
discussion” (p. 74; he probably meant to say ‘scientific discussion’ as it is one of the 
most discussed concepts in philosophy). However, Herschel’s examples of ‘excessively 
complex’ terms nicely illustrate that modern science can, nevertheless, render imprecise 
terms more meaningful: we have, compared to Herschel and his contemporaries, a much 
better, more circumscribed and accurate idea of the referent of terms like ‘man’, ‘life’ 
and ‘instinct’.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Harari [11] speaks, in respect with the Scientific Revolution, even of “a revolution of ignorance. The 
great discovery that launched the Scientific Revolution was the discovery that humans do not know the 
answers to their most important questions” (p. 279). Interesting, in this respect, is that “During the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries, Europeans began to draw world maps with lots of empty spaces (…)” (p. 
319). 
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2.3. Indiscriminate terms. 
 
Indiscriminate or monolithic terms are terms whose real-world referent(s), at a certain 
point in time, turn(s) out to be more complex and multifaceted than the use of single and 
unqualified terms suggests. Put differently: terms often turn out to be in need of refi-
nement and qualification for not capturing the full subtlety and complexity of reality. 
Julian Elliott [12], an educational psychologist, for example, has argued for the aban-
donment of the label ‘dyslexia’ because it has become impossible to meaningfully se-
parate dyslexic readers from other poor readers. The term was coined in 1887 by Rudolf 
Berlin for a severe form of word blindness, despite normal intelligence. Now that it has 
become clear that there exist many forms and degrees of word blindness, we probably 
should try to agree on a redefinition of the term, rather than abandon it. The distinction 
between polythetic and monothetic definitions and that between categorical and dimen-
sional definitions can, in this respect, be helpful. The term ‘gene’ is, to many scientists, 
a monothetic-categorical term in that all genes (1) share a function and are made of, or 
rely on, the same ‘stuff’ (sequences of nucleic acids) and (2) are categorical entities 
(there are no gradations between genes and non-genes). The paradigmatic example of a 
polythetic-categorical term is Wittgenstein’s ‘game’. It refers to a large number of di-
verse activities that, according to Wittgenstein, share certain characteristics, none of 
which is ‘essential’, i.e., necessary or sufficient, for membership of the class of games. 
The terminology that we use for mental disorders is, likewise, generally described as 
polythetic-categorical, meaning that disorders are considered present in individuals 
when a certain combination and number of symptoms are observed and completely ab-
sent when these symptoms are not observed. One problem, associated with this termi-
nological categorization, is that it makes abstraction of the fact that many mental disor-
ders are characterized by gradations or dimensions, hence the call for a polythetic-di-
mensional terminology [13].  
 
2.4. Ambiguous terms. 
 
One of the most common forms of terminological dysfunctionality in science is caused 
by the several, often related meanings that many words and phrases have (cf. the two 
meanings of the phrase ‘the Scientific Revolution’). Semantic multifariousness is, in 
itself, of course not dysfunctional. On the contrary, conceptual pluralism is the norm for 
epistemic terms. This pluralism only becomes potentially problematic if scientists and 
scholars do not (fully) realize or do not want to acknowledge that they attach different 
meanings to technical terms or that these terms are used in different ways. In this case, 
we must speak, not of multifaceted terms but of dubious or ambiguous terms. Herschel 
[8] put it thus: “But, what is worst of all, some, nay most [terms], have two or three 
meanings; sufficiently distinct from each other to make a proposition true in one sense 
and false in another, or even false altogether; yet not distinct enough to keep us from 
confounding them (…)” (p. 21). Charles Darwin, for example, confusingly used the 
term ‘isolation’ for both geographical and reproductive isolation and ‘variety’ for in-
dividual and populational variation. Hume [14] points out that situations where “dispu-
tants affix different ideas to the terms employed” (p. 53) in a controversy are particu-
larly problematic. This is often the case when a controversy “has been long kept on 
foot” (ibid.). Mayr [10] makes the same analysis: many controversies in the history of 
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science “were caused almost entirely because the opponents referred to very different 
concepts by the same term” (p. 44). 
 
2.5. Inapt terms. 
 
Many new terms come into being as metaphors (language has been said to be a dictio-
nary of dead metaphors). This is one of the reasons why metaphors are so important to 
science as this enterprise is, of course, ‘in the business’ of discovering new phenomena 
and developing new insights. Many of these scientific metaphors are inappropriate and, 
in some cases, even outright misleading: biological ‘evolution’ (from the Latin ‘evolu-
tio’, the noun of action from the verb ‘evolvere’) is not ‘an opening of what was rolled 
up’, most so-called ‘planets’ (from the Greek ‘planasthai’, ‘to wander’) do not wander 
through the universe, nature does not ‘select’ and genes are not ‘selfish’.7 In this last ca-
se, the transition from inapt and misleading metaphor to apt or neutral literal term is still 
not finished.
8
 Literal terms can also be inapt though, or initially be perceived as such. 
The meta-scientific term ‘scientist’, an ‘illegitimate’ hybrid of the Latin term ‘scientia’ 
and the Greek suffix ‘ist’ (from -ιστής) is a classic example [4]. Coined by the polymath 
William Whewell in 1833, as a substitute for ‘natural philosopher’, it was, because of 
this ‘illegitimacy’, very slow to become established, especially in England (versus the 
United States). So-called Whiggism is a good example of an inapt literal science term 
(if we consider history to be a science). It refers to an approach of the past that is colo-
red or distorted by a contemporary perspective or agenda. Professional historians 
should, in principle, interpret the past, not from the present but from the perspective of 
the past. Part of the reason why the abandonment, by professional historians, since the 
19
th
 century, of an amateurish Whiggish perspective in favor of a historical perspective, 
is not better or more generally known, and maybe (and more importantly) also why his-
torians themselves still wrestle with this transition, may be that it has not been labeled 
very well. We live in the present and are therefore indeed inclined to interpret the past 
from that present, in the same way that we, for example, were once naïve geocentrists 
(as earth dwellers), anthropocentrists (as human beings) and ethnocentrists (as members 
of a certain society and culture). An apt alternative for the phrase ‘Whig history’ is the-
refore ‘presentcentrism’. The opposite, modern and more objective interpretation of his-
tory should then be referred to as ‘historiocentric’. The phrase ‘the Scientific Revolu-
tion’, for example, is clearly presentcentric and therefore potentially misleading, whe-
reas the phrase ‘the Reformation in (natural) Philosophy’ is historiocentric. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The topic of scientific notation systems is broad and diverse. It ranges from mathemati-
cal notation systems to the role of metaphors and rhetoric in science. The literature al-
ready covers many of these subjects but there are still some lacunae. One lacuna was re-
cently addressed by Wootton [1] in his study of science-methodology terms that reflect 
the radically new cognitive attitude of our 17
th
 century ancestors towards both received 
knowledge and the acquisition of new knowledge. In this short article, we have briefly 
                                                          
7
 Ironically, true ‘planets’, i.e., planetary-mass objects that do not orbit a star but wander freely through 
space, are, in modern scientific parlance, called rogue, nomad, interstellar or orphan planets. 
8
 Dawkins [15] has tentatively admitted that he should have used a different metaphor. 
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touched upon what we consider to be a second major lacuna: qualitative dysfunctions 
and improvements in non-metaphorical science-content terms and phrases. We associate 
scientific progress with better technology and, linguistically, with a steady and incre-
mental increase of scientific terms. It is less well known and acknowledged that it also 
was and is accompanied by the development of an ever more refined, less ambiguous 
and more accurate and meaningful terminological apparatus. 
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